Aruba Certified Network Security Associate Exam Questions and Answers
A company has Aruba Mobility Controllers (MCs), Aruba campus APs, and ArubaOS-CX switches. The company plans to use ClearPass Policy Manager (CPPM) to classify endpoints by type. The company is contemplating the use of ClearPass’s TCP fingerprinting capabilities.
What is a consideration for using those capabilities?
Options:
ClearPass admins will need to provide the credentials of an API admin account to configure on Aruba devices.
You will need to mirror traffic to one of CPPM's span ports from a device such as a core routing switch.
ArubaOS-CX switches do not offer the support necessary for CPPM to use TCP fingerprinting on wired endpoints.
TCP fingerprinting of wireless endpoints requires a third-party Mobility Device Management (MDM) solution.
Answer:
BExplanation:
ClearPass Policy Manager (CPPM) uses various methods to classify endpoints, and one of them is TCP fingerprinting, which involves analyzing TCP/IP packets to identify the type of device or operating system sending them. To utilize TCP fingerprinting capabilities, network traffic needs to be accessible to the CPPM. This can be done by mirroring traffic to CPPM’s span port from a device that can see the traffic, like a core routing switch. This approach allows CPPM to observe the TCP characteristics of devices as they communicate over the network, enabling it to make more accurate decisions for device classification.
How does the AOS firewall determine which rules to apply to a specific client's traffic?
Options:
The firewall applies the rules in policies associated with the client's user role.
The firewall applies every rule that includes the client's IP address as the source.
The firewall applies the rules in policies associated with the client's WLAN.
The firewall applies every rule that includes the client's IP address as the source or destination.
Answer:
AExplanation:
In an AOS-8 architecture, the Mobility Controller (MC) includes a stateful firewall that enforces policies on client traffic. The firewall uses user roles to apply policies, allowing granular control over traffic based on the client’s identity and context.
User Roles: In AOS-8, each client is assigned a user role after authentication (e.g., via 802.1X, MAC authentication, or captive portal). The user role contains firewall policies (rules) that define what traffic is allowed or denied for clients in that role. For example, a "guest" role might allow only HTTP/HTTPS traffic, while an "employee" role might allow broader access.
Option A, "The firewall applies the rules in policies associated with the client's user role," is correct. The AOS firewall evaluates traffic based on the user role assigned to the client. Each role has a set of policies (rules) that are applied in order, and the first matching rule determines the action (permit or deny). For example, if a client is in the "employee" role, the firewall applies the rules defined in the "employee" role’s policy.
Option B, "The firewall applies every rule that includes the client's IP address as the source," is incorrect. The firewall does not apply rules based solely on the client’s IP address; it uses the user role. Rules within a role may include IP addresses, but the role determines which rules are evaluated.
Option C, "The firewall applies the rules in policies associated with the client's WLAN," is incorrect. While the WLAN configuration defines the initial role for clients (e.g., the default 802.1X role), the firewall applies rules based on the client’s current user role, which may change after authentication (e.g., via a RADIUS VSA like Aruba-User-Role).
Option D, "The firewall applies every rule that includes the client's IP address as the source or destination," is incorrect for the same reason as Option B. The firewall uses the user role to determine which rules to apply, not just the client’s IP address.
The HPE Aruba Networking AOS-8 8.11 User Guide states:
"The AOS firewall on the Mobility Controller applies rules based on the user role assigned to a client. Each user role contains a set of firewall policies that define the allowed or denied traffic for clients in that role. For example, a policy in the ‘employee’ role might include a rule like ipv4 user any http permit to allow HTTP traffic. The firewall evaluates the rules in the client’s role in order, and the first matching rule determines the action for the traffic." (Page 325, Firewall Policies Section)
Additionally, the HPE Aruba Networking Security Guide notes:
"User roles in AOS-8 provide a powerful mechanism for firewall policy enforcement. The firewall determines which rules to apply to a client’s traffic by looking at the policies associated with the client’s user role, which is assigned during authentication or via a RADIUS VSA like Aruba-User-Role." (Page 50, Role-Based Access Control Section)
What is a consideration for implementing wireless containment in response to unauthorized devices discovered by ArubaOS Wireless Intrusion Detection (WIP)?
Options:
It is best practice to implement automatic containment of unauthorized devices to eliminate the need to locate and remove them.
Wireless containment only works against unauthorized wireless devices that connect to your corporate LAN, so it does not offer protection against Interfering APs.
Your company should consider legal implications before you enable automatic containment or implement manual containment.
Because wireless containment has a lower risk of targeting legitimate neighbors than wired containment, it is recommended in most use cases.
Answer:
CExplanation:
When implementing wireless containment as a response to unauthorized devices, a company should consider the legal implications. Wireless containment might affect devices that are not part of the company's network and could be considered as a form of interference. This could have legal consequences, and therefore, such actions should be carefully reviewed and ideally should be performed in a targeted and controlled manner, reducing the risk of legal issues.
What is a benefit of Protected Management Frames (PMF). sometimes called Management Frame Protection (MFP)?
Options:
PMF helps to protect APs and MCs from unauthorized management access by hackers.
PMF ensures trial traffic between APs and Mobility Controllers (MCs) is encrypted.
PMF prevents hackers from capturing the traffic between APs and Mobility Controllers.
PMF protects clients from DoS attacks based on forged de-authentication frames
Answer:
DExplanation:
Protected Management Frames (PMF), also known as Management Frame Protection (MFP), is designed to protect clients from denial-of-service (DoS) attacks that involve forged de-authentication and disassociation frames. These attacks can disconnect legitimate clients from the network. PMF provides a way to authenticate these management frames, ensuring that they are not forged, thus enhancing the security of the wireless network.
You are checking the Security Dashboard in the Web UI for your AOS solution and see that Wireless Intrusion Prevention (WIP) has discovered a rogue radio operating in ad hoc mode with open security. What correctly describes a threat that the radio could pose?
Options:
It could be attempting to conceal itself from detection by changing its BSSID and SSID frequently.
It could open a backdoor into the corporate LAN for unauthorized users.
It is running in a non-standard 802.11 mode and could effectively jam the wireless signal.
It is flooding the air with many wireless frames in a likely attempt at a DoS attack.
Answer:
BExplanation:
The AOS Security Dashboard in an AOS-8 solution (Mobility Controllers or Mobility Master) provides visibility into wireless threats detected by the Wireless Intrusion Prevention (WIP) system. The scenario describes a rogue radio operating in ad hoc mode with open security. Ad hoc mode in 802.11 allows devices to communicate directly with each other without an access point (AP), forming a peer-to-peer network. Open security means no encryption or authentication is required to connect.
Ad Hoc Mode Threat: An ad hoc network created by a rogue device can pose significant risks, especially if a corporate client connects to it. Since ad hoc mode allows direct device-to-device communication, a client that joins the ad hoc network might inadvertently bridge the corporate LAN to the rogue network, especially if the client is also connected to the corporate network (e.g., via a wired connection or another wireless interface).
Option B, "It could open a backdoor into the corporate LAN for unauthorized users," is correct. If a corporate client connects to the rogue ad hoc network (e.g., due to a misconfiguration or auto-connect setting), the client might bridge the ad hoc network to the corporate LAN, allowing unauthorized users on the ad hoc network to access corporate resources. This is a common threat with ad hoc networks, as they bypass the security controls of the corporate AP infrastructure.
Option A, "It could be attempting to conceal itself from detection by changing its BSSID and SSID frequently," is incorrect. While changing BSSID and SSID can be a tactic to evade detection, this is not a typical characteristic of ad hoc networks and is not implied by the scenario. Ad hoc networks are generally visible to WIP unless explicitly hidden.
Option C, "It is running in a non-standard 802.11 mode and could effectively jam the wireless signal," is incorrect. Ad hoc mode is a standard 802.11 mode, not a non-standard one. While a rogue device could potentially jam the wireless signal, this is not a direct threat posed by ad hoc mode with open security.
Option D, "It is flooding the air with many wireless frames in a likely attempt at a DoS attack," is incorrect. There is no indication in the scenario that the rogue radio is flooding the air with frames. While ad hoc networks can be used in DoS attacks, the primary threat in this context is the potential for unauthorized access to the corporate LAN.
The HPE Aruba Networking AOS-8 8.11 User Guide states:
"A rogue radio operating in ad hoc mode with open security poses a significant threat, as it can open a backdoor into the corporate LAN. If a corporate client connects to the ad hoc network, it may bridge the ad hoc network to the corporate LAN, allowing unauthorized users to access corporate resources. This is particularly dangerous if the client is also connected to the corporate network via another interface." (Page 422, Wireless Threats Section)
Additionally, the HPE Aruba Networking Security Guide notes:
"Ad hoc networks detected by WIP are a concern because they can act as a backdoor into the corporate LAN. A client that joins an ad hoc network with open security may inadvertently allow unauthorized users to access the corporate network, bypassing the security controls of authorized APs." (Page 73, Ad Hoc Network Threats Section)
You have detected a Rogue AP using the Security Dashboard Which two actions should you take in responding to this event? (Select two)
Options:
There is no need to locale the AP If you manually contain It.
This is a serious security event, so you should always contain the AP immediately regardless of your company's specific policies.
You should receive permission before containing an AP. as this action could have legal Implications.
For forensic purposes, you should copy out logs with relevant information, such as the time mat the AP was detected and the AP's MAC address.
There is no need to locate the AP If the Aruba solution is properly configured to automatically contain it.
Answer:
C, DExplanation:
When responding to the detection of a Rogue AP, it's important to consider legal implications and to gather forensic evidence:
You should receive permission before containing an AP (Option C), as containing it could disrupt service and may have legal implications, especially if the AP is on a network that the organization does not own.
For forensic purposes, it is essential to document the event by copying out logs with relevant information, such as the time the AP was detected and the AP's MAC address (Option D). This information could be crucial if legal action is taken or if a detailed analysis of the security breach is required.
Automatically containing an AP without consideration for the context (Options A and E) can be problematic, as it might inadvertently interfere with neighboring networks and cause legal issues. Immediate containment without consideration of company policy (Option B) could also violate established incident response procedures.
What are some functions of an AruDaOS user role?
Options:
The role determines which authentication methods the user must pass to gain network access
The role determines which firewall policies and bandwidth contract apply to the clients traffic
The role determines which wireless networks (SSiDs) a user is permitted to access
The role determines which control plane ACL rules apply to the client's traffic
Answer:
BExplanation:
An ArubaOS user role determines the firewall policies and bandwidth contracts that apply to the client’s traffic. When a user is authenticated, they are assigned a role, and this role has associated policies that govern network access rights, Quality of Service (QoS), Layer 2 forwarding, Layer 3 routing behaviors, and bandwidth contracts for users or devices.
What is a use case for tunneling traffic between an Aruba switch and an AruDa Mobility Controller (MC)?
Options:
applying firewall policies and deep packet inspection to wired clients
enhancing the security of communications from the access layer to the core with data encryption
securing the network infrastructure control plane by creating a virtual out-of-band-management network
simplifying network infrastructure management by using the MC to push configurations to the switches
Answer:
CExplanation:
Tunneling traffic between an Aruba switch and an Aruba Mobility Controller (MC) allows for the centralized application of firewall policies and deep packet inspection to wired clients. By directing traffic through the MC, network administrators can implement a consistent set of security policies across both wired and wireless segments of the network, enhancing overall network security posture.
What is a reason to set up a packet capture on an Aruba Mobility Controller (MC)?
Options:
The company wants to use ClearPass Policy Manager (CPPM) to profile devices and needs to receive HTTP User-Agent strings from the MC.
The security team believes that a wireless endpoint connected to the MC is launching an attack and wants to examine the traffic more closely.
You want the MC to analyze wireless clients' traffic at a lower level, so that the ArubaOS firewall can control the traffic I based on application.
You want the MC to analyze wireless clients' traffic at a lower level, so that the ArubaOS firewall can control Web traffic based on the destination URL.
Answer:
BExplanation:
Setting up a packet capture on an Aruba Mobility Controller (MC) is particularly useful in scenarios where detailed analysis of network traffic is necessary to identify and address security concerns. Option B is the correct answer because it directly addresses the need to closely examine the traffic of a potentially malicious wireless endpoint. Packet capture on the MC allows the security team to collect and analyze traffic to/from specific endpoints in real-time, providing valuable insights into the nature of the traffic and potentially identifying harmful activities. This capability is essential for forensics and troubleshooting security incidents, enabling administrators to respond effectively to threats.
What is symmetric encryption?
Options:
It simultaneously creates ciphertext and a same-size MAC.
It any form of encryption mat ensures that thee ciphertext Is the same length as the plaintext.
It uses the same key to encrypt plaintext as to decrypt ciphertext.
It uses a Key that is double the size of the message which it encrypts.
Answer:
CExplanation:
Symmetric encryption is a type of encryption where the same key is used to encrypt and decrypt the message. It's called "symmetric" because the key used for encryption is identical to the key used for decryption. The data, or plaintext, is transformed into ciphertext during encryption, and then the same key is used to revert the ciphertext back to plaintext during decryption. It is a straightforward method but requires secure handling and exchange of the encryption key.
Which is a use case for enabling Control Plane Policing on Aruba switches?
Options:
to prevent unauthorized network devices from sending routing updates
to prevent the switch from accepting routing updates from unauthorized users
to encrypt traffic between tunneled node switches and Mobility Controllers (MCs)
to mitigate Denial of Service (Dos) attacks on the switch
Answer:
DExplanation:
Control Plane Policing (CoPP) on Aruba switches is used to mitigate Denial of Service (DoS) attacks on the switch. CoPP allows network administrators to restrict the impact of control plane traffic on the switch's CPU, thereby protecting network stability and integrity. By setting rate limits and specifying allowed traffic types, administrators can prevent malicious or malformed packets from overwhelming the switch's control plane, which could otherwise lead to a DoS condition and potentially disrupt network operations. This use case of CoPP is detailed in Aruba's network management documentation, where best practices and configurations to protect against DoS attacks are discussed.
Two wireless clients, client 1 and client 2, are connected to an ArubaOS Mobility Controller. Subnet 10.1.10.10/24 is a network of servers on the other side of the ArubaOS firewall. The exhibit shows all three firewall rules that apply to these clients.
Which traffic is permitted?
Options:
an HTTPS request from client 1 to 10.1.10.10 and an HTTPS response from 10.1.10.10 to client 1
an HTTPS request from client 1 to 10.1.10.10 and an HTTPS request from 10.1.10.11 to client 1
an HTTPS request from 10.1.10.10 to client 1 and an HTTPS re-sponse from client 1 to 10.1.10.10
an HTTPS request from client 1 to client 2 and an HTTPS request from client 2 to client 1
Answer:
AExplanation:
Based on the exhibit showing the firewall rules, the following traffic is permitted:
Client 1 is allowed to send HTTPS traffic to any destination within the subnet 10.1.10.0/24 because there is a permit rule for the user to access svc-https to that subnet.
Responses to initiated connections are typically allowed by stateful firewalls; hence, an HTTPS response from 10.1.10.10 to client 1 is expected to be permitted even though it is not explicitly mentioned in the firewall rules (assuming the stateful nature of the firewall).
An organization has HPE Aruba Networking infrastructure, including AOS-CX switches and an AOS-8 mobility infrastructure with Mobility Controllers (MCs) and APs. Clients receive certificates from ClearPass Onboard. The infrastructure devices authenticate clients to ClearPass Policy Manager (CPPM). The company wants to start profiling clients to take their device type into account in their access rights.
What is a role that CPPM should play in this plan?
Options:
Assigning clients to their device categories
Helping to forward profiling information to the component responsible for profiling
Accepting and enforcing CoA messages
Enforcing access control decisions
Answer:
AExplanation:
HPE Aruba Networking ClearPass Policy Manager (CPPM) is a network access control (NAC) solution that provides device profiling, authentication, and policy enforcement. In this scenario, the company wants to profile clients to determine their device type and use that information to define access rights. Device profiling in ClearPass involves identifying and categorizing devices based on various attributes, such as DHCP fingerprints, HTTP User-Agent strings, or TCP fingerprinting, to assign them to specific device categories (e.g., Windows, macOS, IoT devices, etc.). These categories can then be used in policy decisions to grant or restrict access.
Option A, "Assigning clients to their device categories," directly aligns with ClearPass’s role in device profiling. ClearPass collects profiling data from network devices (like APs, MCs, or switches) and uses its profiling engine to categorize devices. This categorization is a core function of ClearPass Device Insight, which is integrated into CPPM, and is used to build policies based on device type.
Option B, "Helping to forward profiling information to the component responsible for profiling," is incorrect because ClearPass itself is the component responsible for profiling. It doesn’t forward data to another system for profiling; instead, it collects data (e.g., via DHCP snooping, HTTP headers, or mirrored traffic) and processes it internally.
Option C, "Accepting and enforcing CoA messages," refers to ClearPass’s ability to send Change of Authorization (CoA) messages to network devices to dynamically change a client’s access rights (e.g., reassign a role or disconnect a session). While CoA is part of ClearPass’s enforcement capabilities, it is not directly related to the profiling process or categorizing devices.
Option D, "Enforcing access control decisions," is a broader function of ClearPass. While ClearPass does enforce access control decisions based on profiling data (e.g., by assigning roles or VLANs), the question specifically asks about its role in the profiling process, not the enforcement step that follows.
The HPE Aruba Networking ClearPass Policy Manager 6.11 User Guide states:
"ClearPass Policy Manager provides a mechanism to profile devices that connect to the network. Device profiling collects information about a device during its authentication or through network monitoring (e.g., DHCP, HTTP, or SNMP). The collected data is used to identify and categorize the device into a device category (e.g., Computer, Smartphone, Printer, etc.) and device family (e.g., Windows, Android, etc.). These categories can then be used in policy conditions to enforce access control." (Page 245, Device Profiling Section)
Additionally, the ClearPass Device Insight Data Sheet notes:
"ClearPass Device Insight uses a combination of passive and active profiling techniques to identify and classify devices. It assigns devices to categories based on their attributes, enabling organizations to create granular access policies." (Page 2)
What is one difference between EAP-Tunneled Layer security (EAP-TLS) and Protected EAP (PEAP)?
Options:
EAP-TLS creates a TLS tunnel for transmitting user credentials, while PEAP authenticates the server and supplicant during a TLS handshake.
EAP-TLS requires the supplicant to authenticate with a certificate, hut PEAP allows the supplicant to use a username and password.
EAP-TLS begins with the establishment of a TLS tunnel, but PEAP does not use a TLS tunnel as part of Its process
EAP-TLS creates a TLS tunnel for transmitting user credentials securely while PEAP protects user credentials with TKIP encryption.
Answer:
BExplanation:
EAP-TLS and PEAP both provide secure authentication methods, but they differ in their requirements for client-side authentication. EAP-TLS requires both the client (supplicant) and the server to authenticate each other with certificates, thereby ensuring a very high level of security. On the other hand, PEAP requires a server-side certificate to create a secure tunnel and allows the client to authenticate using less stringent methods, such as a username and password, which are then protected by the tunnel. This makes PEAP more flexible in environments where client-side certificates are not feasible.
What is an Authorized client, as defined by AOS Wireless Intrusion Prevention System (WIP)?
Options:
A client that is on the WIP whitelist
A client that has a certificate issued by a trusted Certification Authority (CA)
A client that is NOT on the WIP blacklist
A client that has successfully authenticated to an authorized AP and passed encrypted traffic
Answer:
DExplanation:
The AOS Wireless Intrusion Prevention System (WIP) in an AOS-8 architecture (Mobility Controllers or Mobility Master) is designed to detect and mitigate wireless threats, such as rogue APs and unauthorized clients. WIP classifies clients and APs based on their behavior and status in the network.
Authorized Client Definition: In the context of WIP, an "Authorized" client is one that has successfully authenticated to an authorized AP (an AP managed by the MC and part of the company’s network) and is actively passing encrypted traffic. This typically means the client has completed 802.1X authentication (e.g., in a WPA3-Enterprise network) or PSK authentication (e.g., in a WPA3-Personal network) and is communicating securely with the AP.
Option D, "A client that has successfully authenticated to an authorized AP and passed encrypted traffic," is correct. This matches the WIP definition of an Authorized client: the client must authenticate to an AP that is classified as "Authorized" (i.e., part of the company’s network) and must be passing encrypted traffic, indicating a secure connection (e.g., using WPA3 encryption).
Option A, "A client that is on the WIP whitelist," is incorrect. WIP does not use a client whitelist for classification. The AP whitelist is used to authorize APs, not clients. Client classification (e.g., Authorized, Interfering) is based on their authentication status and connection to authorized APs.
Option B, "A client that has a certificate issued by a trusted Certification Authority (CA)," is incorrect. While a certificate might be used for 802.1X authentication (e.g., EAP-TLS), WIP does not classify clients as Authorized based on their certificate status. The classification depends on successful authentication to an authorized AP and encrypted traffic.
Option C, "A client that is NOT on the WIP blacklist," is incorrect. WIP does use blacklisting (e.g., for clients that violate security policies), but being "not on the blacklist" does not make a client Authorized. A client must actively authenticate to an authorized AP and pass encrypted traffic to be classified as Authorized.
The HPE Aruba Networking AOS-8 8.11 User Guide states:
"In the Wireless Intrusion Prevention (WIP) system, an ‘Authorized’ client is defined as a client that has successfully authenticated to an authorized AP and is passing encrypted traffic. An authorized AP is one that is managed by the Mobility Controller and part of the company’s network. For example, a client that completes 802.1X authentication to an authorized AP using WPA3-Enterprise and sends encrypted traffic is classified as Authorized." (Page 414, WIP Client Classification Section)
Additionally, the HPE Aruba Networking Security Guide notes:
"WIP classifies clients as ‘Authorized’ if they have authenticated to an authorized AP and are passing encrypted traffic, indicating a secure connection. Clients that are not authenticated or are connected to rogue or neighbor APs are classified as ‘Interfering’ or other categories, depending on their behavior." (Page 78, WIP Classifications Section)
You are deploying a new wireless solution with an HPE Aruba Networking Mobility Master (MM), Mobility Controllers (MCs), and campus APs (CAPs). The solution will include a WLAN that uses Tunnel for the forwarding mode and WPA3-Enterprise for the security option.
You have decided to assign the WLAN to VLAN 301, a new VLAN. A pair of core routing switches will act as the default router for wireless user traffic.
Which links need to carry VLAN 301?
Options:
Only links on the path between APs and the core routing switches
Only links on the path between APs and the MC
All links in the campus LAN to ensure seamless roaming
Only links between MC ports and the core routing switches
Answer:
DExplanation:
In an HPE Aruba Networking AOS-8 architecture with a Mobility Master (MM), Mobility Controllers (MCs), and campus APs (CAPs), the WLAN is configured to use Tunnel forwarding mode and WPA3-Enterprise security. In Tunnel mode, all user traffic from the APs is encapsulated in a GRE tunnel and sent to the MC, which then forwards the traffic to the appropriate VLAN. The WLAN is assigned to VLAN 301, and the core routing switches act as the default router for wireless user traffic.
Tunnel Forwarding Mode: In this mode, the AP does not directly place user traffic onto the wired network. Instead, the AP tunnels all user traffic to the MC over a GRE tunnel. The MC then decapsulates the traffic and places it onto the wired network in the specified VLAN (VLAN 301 in this case). This means the VLAN tagging for user traffic occurs at the MC, not at the AP.
VLAN 301 Assignment: Since the WLAN is assigned to VLAN 301, the MC will tag user traffic with VLAN 301 when forwarding it to the wired network. The core routing switches, acting as the default router, need to receive this traffic on VLAN 301 to route it appropriately.
Therefore, VLAN 301 needs to be carried on the links between the MC ports and the core routing switches, as this is where the MC forwards the user traffic after decapsulating it from the GRE tunnel.
Option A, "Only links on the path between APs and the core routing switches," is incorrect because, in Tunnel mode, the APs do not directly forward user traffic to the wired network. The traffic is tunneled to the MC, so the links between the APs and the core switches do not need to carry VLAN 301 for user traffic (though they may carry other VLANs for AP management).
Option B, "Only links on the path between APs and the MC," is incorrect for the same reason. The GRE tunnel between the AP and MC carries encapsulated user traffic, and VLAN 301 tagging occurs at the MC, not on the AP-to-MC link.
Option C, "All links in the campus LAN to ensure seamless roaming," is incorrect because VLAN 301 only needs to be present where the MC forwards user traffic to the wired network (i.e., between the MC and the core switches). Extending VLAN 301 to all links is unnecessary and could introduce security or scalability issues.
Option D, "Only links between MC ports and the core routing switches," is correct because the MC places user traffic onto VLAN 301 and forwards it to the core switches, which act as the default router.
The HPE Aruba Networking AOS-8 8.11 User Guide states:
"In Tunnel forwarding mode, the AP encapsulates all user traffic in a GRE tunnel and sends it to the Mobility Controller (MC). The MC decapsulates the traffic and forwards it to the wired network on the VLAN assigned to the WLAN. For example, if the WLAN is assigned to VLAN 301, the MC tags the user traffic with VLAN 301 and sends it out of its wired interface to the upstream switch. Therefore, the VLAN must be configured on the links between the MC and the upstream switch or router that acts as the default gateway for the VLAN." (Page 275, Tunnel Forwarding Mode Section)
Additionally, the HPE Aruba Networking Wireless LAN Design Guide notes:
"When using Tunnel mode, the VLAN assigned to the WLAN must be carried on the wired links between the Mobility Controller and the default router for the VLAN. The links between the APs and the MC do not need to carry the user VLAN, as all traffic is tunneled to the MC, which handles VLAN tagging." (Page 52, VLAN Configuration Section)
A user attempts to connect to an SSID configured on an AOS-8 mobility architecture with Mobility Controllers (MCs) and APs. The SSID enforces WPA3-Enterprise security and uses HPE Aruba Networking ClearPass Policy Manager (CPPM) as the authentication server. The WLAN has initial role, logon, and 802.1X default role, guest.
A user attempts to connect to the SSID, and CPPM sends an Access-Accept with an Aruba-User-Role VSA of "contractor," which exists on the MC.
What does the MC do?
Options:
Applies the rules in the logon role, then guest role, and the contractor role
Applies the rules in the contractor role
Applies the rules in the contractor role and the logon role
Applies the rules in the contractor role and guest role
Answer:
BExplanation:
In an AOS-8 mobility architecture, the Mobility Controller (MC) manages user roles and policies for wireless clients connecting to SSIDs. When a user connects to an SSID with WPA3-Enterprise security, the MC uses 802.1X authentication to validate the user against an authentication server, in this case, HPE Aruba Networking ClearPass Policy Manager (CPPM). The SSID is configured with specific roles:
Initial role: Applied before authentication begins (not specified in the question, but typically used for pre-authentication access).
Logon role: Applied during the authentication process to allow access to authentication services (e.g., DNS, DHCP, or RADIUS traffic).
802.1X default role (guest): Applied if 802.1X authentication fails or if no specific role is assigned by the RADIUS server after successful authentication.
In this scenario, the user successfully authenticates, and CPPM sends an Access-Accept message with an Aruba-User-Role Vendor-Specific Attribute (VSA) set to "contractor." The "contractor" role exists on the MC, meaning it is a predefined role in the MC’s configuration.
When the MC receives the Aruba-User-Role VSA, it applies the specified role ("contractor") to the user session, overriding the default 802.1X role ("guest"). The MC does not combine the contractor role with other roles like logon or guest; it applies only the role specified by the RADIUS server (CPPM) in the Aruba-User-Role VSA. This is the standard behavior in AOS-8 for role assignment after successful authentication when a VSA specifies a role.
Option A, "Applies the rules in the logon role, then guest role, and the contractor role," is incorrect because the MC does not apply multiple roles in sequence. The logon role is used only during authentication, and the guest role (default 802.1X role) is overridden by the contractor role specified in the VSA.
Option C, "Applies the rules in the contractor role and the logon role," is incorrect because the logon role is no longer applied once authentication is complete; only the contractor role is applied.
Option D, "Applies the rules in the contractor role and guest role," is incorrect because the guest role (default 802.1X role) is not applied when a specific role is assigned via the Aruba-User-Role VSA.
The HPE Aruba Networking AOS-8 8.11 User Guide states:
"When a user authenticates successfully via 802.1X, the Mobility Controller applies the role specified in the Aruba-User-Role VSA returned by the RADIUS server in the Access-Accept message. If the role specified in the VSA exists on the controller, it is applied to the user session, overriding any default 802.1X role configured for the WLAN. The controller does not combine the VSA-specified role with other roles, such as the initial, logon, or default roles." (Page 305, Role Assignment Section)
Additionally, the HPE Aruba Networking ClearPass Policy Manager 6.11 User Guide notes:
"ClearPass can send the Aruba-User-Role VSA in a RADIUS Access-Accept message to assign a specific role to the user on Aruba Mobility Controllers. The role specified in the VSA takes precedence over any default roles configured on the WLAN, ensuring that the user is placed in the intended role." (Page 289, RADIUS Enforcement Section)
You have been asked to send RADIUS debug messages from an AOS-CX switch to a central SIEM server at 10.5.15.6. The server is already defined on the switch with this command:
logging 10.5.15.6
You enter this command:
debug radius all
What is the correct debug destination?
Options:
file
console
buffer
syslog
Answer:
DExplanation:
The scenario involves an AOS-CX switch that needs to send RADIUS debug messages to a central SIEM server at 10.5.15.6. The switch has already been configured to send logs to the SIEM server with the command logging 10.5.15.6, and the command debug radius all has been entered to enable RADIUS debugging.
Debug Command: The debug radius all command enables debugging for all RADIUS-related events on the AOS-CX switch, generating detailed debug messages for RADIUS authentication, accounting, and other operations.
Debug Destination: Debug messages on AOS-CX switches can be sent to various destinations, such as the console, a file, the debug buffer, or a Syslog server. The logging 10.5.15.6 command indicates that the switch is configured to send logs to a Syslog server at 10.5.15.6 (using UDP port 514 by default, unless specified otherwise).
Option D, "syslog," is correct. To send RADIUS debug messages to the SIEM server, the debug destination must be set to "syslog," as the SIEM server is already defined as a Syslog destination with logging 10.5.15.6. The command to set the debug destination to Syslog is debug destination syslog, which ensures that the RADIUS debug messages are sent to the configured Syslog server (10.5.15.6).
Option A, "file," is incorrect. Sending debug messages to a file (e.g., using debug destination file) stores the messages on the switch’s filesystem, not on the SIEM server.
Option B, "console," is incorrect. Sending debug messages to the console (e.g., using debug destination console) displays them on the switch’s console session, not on the SIEM server.
Option C, "buffer," is incorrect. Sending debug messages to the buffer (e.g., using debug destination buffer) stores them in the switch’s debug buffer, which can be viewed with show debug buffer, but does not send them to the SIEM server.
The HPE Aruba Networking AOS-CX 10.12 System Management Guide states:
"To send debug messages, such as RADIUS debug messages, to a central SIEM server, first configure the Syslog server with the logging
Additionally, the HPE Aruba Networking AOS-CX 10.12 Security Guide notes:
"RADIUS debug messages can be sent to a Syslog server for centralized monitoring. After enabling RADIUS debugging with debug radius all, use debug destination syslog to send the messages to the Syslog server configured with the logging command, such as a SIEM server at 10.5.15.6." (Page 152, RADIUS Debugging Section)
Which is a correct description of a stage in the Lockheed Martin kill chain?
Options:
In the weaponization stage, which occurs after malware has been delivered to a system, the malware executes its function.
In the exploitation and installation phases, malware creates a backdoor into the infected system for the hacker.
In the reconnaissance stage, the hacker assesses the impact of the attack and how much information was exfiltrated.
In the delivery stage, malware collects valuable data and delivers or exfiltrates it to the hacker.
Answer:
BExplanation:
The Lockheed Martin Cyber Kill Chain is a framework that outlines the stages of a cyber attack, from initial reconnaissance to achieving the attacker’s objective. It is often referenced in HPE Aruba Networking security documentation to help organizations understand and mitigate threats. The stages are: Reconnaissance, Weaponization, Delivery, Exploitation, Installation, Command and Control (C2), and Actions on Objectives.
Option A, "In the weaponization stage, which occurs after malware has been delivered to a system, the malware executes its function," is incorrect. The weaponization stage occurs before delivery, not after. In this stage, the attacker creates a deliverable payload (e.g., combining malware with an exploit). The execution of the malware happens in the exploitation stage, not weaponization.
Option B, "In the exploitation and installation phases, malware creates a backdoor into the infected system for the hacker," is correct. The exploitation phase involves the attacker exploiting a vulnerability (e.g., a software flaw) to execute the malware on the target system. The installation phase follows, where the malware installs itself to establish persistence, often by creating a backdoor (e.g., a remote access tool) to allow the hacker to maintain access to the system. These two phases are often linked in the kill chain as the malware gains a foothold and ensures continued access.
Option C, "In the reconnaissance stage, the hacker assesses the impact of the attack and how much information was exfiltrated," is incorrect. The reconnaissance stage occurs at the beginning of the kill chain, where the attacker gathers information about the target (e.g., network topology, vulnerabilities). Assessing the impact and exfiltration occurs in the Actions on Objectives stage, the final stage of the kill chain.
Option D, "In the delivery stage, malware collects valuable data and delivers or exfiltrates it to the hacker," is incorrect. The delivery stage involves the attacker transmitting the weaponized payload to the target (e.g., via a phishing email). Data collection and exfiltration occur later, in the Actions on Objectives stage, not during delivery.
The HPE Aruba Networking Security Guide states:
"The Lockheed Martin Cyber Kill Chain outlines the stages of a cyber attack. In the exploitation phase, the attacker exploits a vulnerability to execute the malware on the target system. In the installation phase, the malware creates a backdoor or other persistence mechanism, such as a remote access tool, to allow the hacker to maintain access to the infected system for future actions." (Page 18, Cyber Kill Chain Overview Section)
Additionally, the HPE Aruba Networking AOS-8 8.11 User Guide notes:
"The exploitation and installation phases of the Lockheed Martin kill chain involve the malware gaining a foothold on the target system. During exploitation, the malware is executed by exploiting a vulnerability, and during installation, it creates a backdoor to ensure persistent access for the hacker, enabling further stages like command and control." (Page 420, Threat Mitigation Section)
A company has HPE Aruba Networking Mobility Controllers (MCs), campus APs, and AOS-CX switches. The company plans to use HPE Aruba Networking ClearPass Policy Manager (CPPM) to classify endpoints by type. This company is using only CPPM and no other HPE Aruba Networking ClearPass solutions.
The HPE Aruba Networking ClearPass admins tell you that they want to use HTTP User-Agent strings to help profile the endpoints.
What should you do as a part of setting up Mobility Controllers (MCs) to support this requirement?
Options:
Create datapath mirrors that use the CPPM's IP address as the destination.
Create an IF-MAP profile, which specifies credentials for an API admin account on CPPM.
Create control path mirrors to mirror HTTP traffic from clients to CPPM.
Create a firewall whitelist rule that permits HTTP and CPPM's IP address.
Answer:
AExplanation:
HPE Aruba Networking ClearPass Policy Manager (CPPM) uses device profiling to classify endpoints, and one of its profiling methods involves analyzing HTTP User-Agent strings to identify device types (e.g., iPhone, Windows laptop). HTTP User-Agent strings are sent in HTTP headers when a client accesses a website. For CPPM to profile devices using HTTP User-Agent strings, it must receive the HTTP traffic from the clients. In this scenario, the company is using Mobility Controllers (MCs), campus APs, and AOS-CX switches, and CPPM is the only ClearPass solution in use.
HTTP User-Agent Profiling: CPPM can passively profile devices by analyzing HTTP traffic, but it needs to receive this traffic. In an AOS-8 architecture, the MC can mirror client traffic to CPPM for profiling. Since HTTP traffic is part of the data plane (user traffic), the MC must mirror the data plane traffic (not control plane traffic) to CPPM.
Option A, "Create datapath mirrors that use the CPPM's IP address as the destination," is correct. The MC can be configured to mirror client HTTP traffic to CPPM using a datapath mirror (also known as a GRE mirror). This involves setting up a mirror session on the MC that sends a copy of the client’s HTTP traffic to CPPM’s IP address. CPPM then analyzes the HTTP User-Agent strings in this traffic to profile the endpoints. For example, the command mirror session 1 destination ip
Option B, "Create an IF-MAP profile, which specifies credentials for an API admin account on CPPM," is incorrect. IF-MAP (Interface for Metadata Access Points) is a protocol used for sharing profiling data between ClearPass and other systems (e.g., Aruba Introspect), but it is not used for sending HTTP traffic to CPPM for profiling. Additionally, IF-MAP is not relevant when only CPPM is in use.
Option C, "Create control path mirrors to mirror HTTP traffic from clients to CPPM," is incorrect. Control path (control plane) traffic includes management traffic between the MC and APs (e.g., AP registration, heartbeats), not client HTTP traffic. HTTP traffic is part of the data plane, so a datapath mirror is required, not a control path mirror.
Option D, "Create a firewall whitelist rule that permits HTTP and CPPM's IP address," is incorrect. A firewall whitelist rule on the MC might be needed to allow traffic to CPPM, but this is not the primary step for enabling HTTP User-Agent profiling. The key requirement is to mirror the HTTP traffic to CPPM, which is done via a datapath mirror, not a firewall rule.
The HPE Aruba Networking AOS-8 8.11 User Guide states:
"To enable ClearPass Policy Manager (CPPM) to profile devices using HTTP User-Agent strings, the Mobility Controller (MC) must mirror client HTTP traffic to CPPM. This is done by creating a datapath mirror session that sends a copy of the client’s HTTP traffic to CPPM’s IP address. For example, use the command mirror session 1 destination ip
Additionally, the HPE Aruba Networking ClearPass Policy Manager 6.11 User Guide notes:
"HTTP User-Agent profiling requires ClearPass to receive HTTP traffic from clients. In an Aruba Mobility Controller environment, configure a datapath mirror to send HTTP traffic to ClearPass’s IP address. ClearPass will parse the HTTP User-Agent strings to identify device types and operating systems, enabling accurate profiling." (Page 249, HTTP User-Agent Profiling Section)
What distinguishes a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack from a traditional Denial or service attack (DoS)?
Options:
A DDoS attack originates from external devices, while a DoS attack originates from internal devices
A DDoS attack is launched from multiple devices, while a DoS attack is launched from a single device
A DoS attack targets one server, a DDoS attack targets all the clients that use a server
A DDoS attack targets multiple devices, while a DoS Is designed to Incapacitate only one device
Answer:
BExplanation:
The main distinction between a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack and a traditional Denial of Service (DoS) attack is that a DDoS attack is launched from multiple devices, whereas a DoS attack originates from a single device. This distinction is critical because the distributed nature of a DDoS attack makes it more difficult to mitigate. Multiple attacking sources can generate a higher volume of malicious traffic, overwhelming the target more effectively than a single source, as seen in a DoS attack. DDoS attacks exploit a variety of devices across the internet, often coordinated using botnets, to flood targets with excessive requests, leading to service degradation or complete service denial.
Which is a correct description of a stage in the Lockheed Martin kill chain?
Options:
In the delivery stage, malware collects valuable data and delivers or exfilltrated it to the hacker.
In the reconnaissance stage, the hacker assesses the impact of the attack and how much information was exfilltrated.
In the weaponization stage, which occurs after malware has been delivered to a system, the malware executes Its function.
In the exploitation and installation phases, malware creates a backdoor into the infected system for the hacker.
Answer:
DExplanation:
The Lockheed Martin Cyber Kill Chain model describes the stages of a cyber attack. In the exploitation phase, the attacker uses vulnerabilities to gain access to the system. Following this, in the installation phase, the attacker installs a backdoor or other malicious software to ensure persistent access to the compromised system. This backdoor can then be used to control the system, steal data, or execute additional attacks.
You need to implement a WPA3-Enterprise network that can also support WPA2-Enterprise clients. What is a valid configuration for the WPA3-Enterprise WLAN?
Options:
CNSA mode disabled with 256-bit keys
CNSA mode disabled with 128-bit keys
CNSA mode enabled with 256-bit keys
CNSA mode enabled with 128-bit keys
Answer:
AExplanation:
In an Aruba network, when setting up a WPA3-Enterprise network that also supports WPA2-Enterprise clients, you would typically configure the network to operate in a transitional mode that supports both protocols. CNSA (Commercial National Security Algorithm) mode is intended for networks that require higher security standards as specified by the US National Security Agency (NSA). However, for compatibility with WPA2 clients, which do not support CNSA requirements, you would disable CNSA mode. WPA3 can use 256-bit encryption keys, which offer a higher level of security than the 128-bit keys used in WPA2.
What is social engineering?
Options:
Hackers use Artificial Intelligence (Al) to mimic a user’s online behavior so they can infiltrate a network and launch an attack.
Hackers use employees to circumvent network security and gather the information they need to launch an attack.
Hackers intercept traffic between two users, eavesdrop on their messages, and pretend to be one or both users.
Hackers spoof the source IP address in their communications so they appear to be a legitimate user.
Answer:
BExplanation:
Social engineering in the context of network security refers to the techniques used by hackers to manipulate individuals into breaking normal security procedures and best practices to gain unauthorized access to systems, networks, or physical locations, or for financial gain. Hackers use various forms of deception to trick employees into handing over confidential or personal information that can be used for fraudulent purposes. This definition encompasses phishing attacks, pretexting, baiting, and other manipulative techniques designed to exploit human psychology. Unlike other hacking methods that rely on technical means, social engineering targets the human element of security. References to social engineering, its methods, and defense strategies are commonly found in security training manuals, cybersecurity awareness programs, and authoritative resources like those from the SANS Institute or cybersecurity agencies.
How can hackers implement a man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack against a wireless client?
Options:
The hacker uses a combination of software and hardware to jam the RF band and prevent the client from connecting to any wireless networks.
The hacker runs an NMap scan on the wireless client to find its MAC and IP address. The hacker then connects to another network and spoofs those addresses.
The hacker uses spear-phishing to probe for the IP addresses that the client is attempting to reach. The hacker device then spoofs those IP addresses.
The hacker connects a device to the same wireless network as the client and responds to the client's ARP requests with the hacker device's MAC address.
Answer:
DExplanation:
A man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack involves an attacker positioning themselves between a wireless client and the legitimate network to intercept or manipulate traffic. HPE Aruba Networking documentation often discusses MITM attacks in the context of wireless security threats and mitigation strategies.
Option D, "The hacker connects a device to the same wireless network as the client and responds to the client's ARP requests with the hacker device's MAC address," is correct. This describes an ARP poisoning (or ARP spoofing) attack, a common MITM technique in wireless networks. The hacker joins the same wireless network as the client (e.g., by authenticating with the same SSID and credentials). Once on the network, the hacker sends fake ARP responses to the client, associating the hacker’s MAC address with the IP address of the default gateway (or another target device). This causes the client to send traffic to the hacker’s device instead of the legitimate gateway, allowing the hacker to intercept, modify, or forward the traffic, thus performing an MITM attack.
Option A, "The hacker uses a combination of software and hardware to jam the RF band and prevent the client from connecting to any wireless networks," is incorrect. Jamming the RF band would disrupt all wireless communication, including the hacker’s ability to intercept traffic. This is a denial-of-service (DoS) attack, not an MITM attack.
Option B, "The hacker runs an NMap scan on the wireless client to find its MAC and IP address. The hacker then connects to another network and spoofs those addresses," is incorrect. NMap scans are used for network discovery and port scanning, not for implementing an MITM attack. Spoofing MAC and IP addresses on another network does not position the hacker to intercept the client’s traffic on the original network.
Option C, "The hacker uses spear-phishing to probe for the IP addresses that the client is attempting to reach. The hacker device then spoofs those IP addresses," is incorrect. Spear-phishing is a delivery method for malware or credentials theft, not a direct method for implementing an MITM attack. Spoofing IP addresses alone does not allow the hacker to intercept traffic unless they are on the same network and can manipulate routing (e.g., via ARP poisoning).
The HPE Aruba Networking AOS-8 8.11 User Guide states:
"A common man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack against wireless clients involves ARP poisoning. The hacker connects a device to the same wireless network as the client and sends fake ARP responses to the client, associating the hacker’s MAC address with the IP address of the default gateway. This causes the client to send traffic to the hacker’s device, allowing the hacker to intercept and manipulate the traffic." (Page 422, Wireless Threats Section)
Additionally, the HPE Aruba Networking Security Guide notes:
"ARP poisoning is a prevalent MITM attack in wireless networks. The attacker joins the same network as the client and responds to the client’s ARP requests with the attacker’s MAC address, redirecting traffic through the attacker’s device. This allows the attacker to intercept sensitive data or modify traffic between the client and the legitimate destination." (Page 72, Wireless MITM Attacks Section)
A company with 465 employees wants to deploy an open WLAN for guests. The company wants the experience to be as follows:
Guests select the WLAN and connect without having to enter a password.
Guests are redirected to a welcome web page and log in.The company also wants to provide encryption for the network for devices that are capable. Which security options should you implement for the WLAN?
Options:
Opportunistic Wireless Encryption (OWE) and WPA3-Personal
Captive portal and WPA3-Personal
WPA3-Personal and MAC-Auth
Captive portal and Opportunistic Wireless Encryption (OWE) in transition mode
Answer:
DExplanation:
The company wants to deploy an open WLAN for guests with the following requirements:
Guests connect without entering a password (open authentication).
Guests are redirected to a welcome web page and log in (captive portal).
Encryption is provided for devices that support it.
Open WLAN with Captive Portal: An open WLAN means no pre-shared key (PSK) or 802.1X authentication is required to connect. A captive portal can be used to redirect users to a web page where they must log in (e.g., with guest credentials). This meets the requirement for guests to connect without a password and then log in via a web page.
Encryption for Capable Devices: The company wants to provide encryption for devices that support it, even on an open WLAN. Opportunistic Wireless Encryption (OWE) is a WPA3 feature designed for open networks. OWE provides encryption without requiring a password by negotiating unique encryption keys for each client using a Diffie-Hellman key exchange. OWE in transition mode allows both OWE-capable devices (which use encryption) and non-OWE devices (which connect without encryption) to join the same SSID, ensuring compatibility.
Option A, "Opportunistic Wireless Encryption (OWE) and WPA3-Personal," is incorrect. WPA3-Personal requires a pre-shared key (password), which conflicts with the requirement for guests to connect without entering a password.
Option B, "Captive portal and WPA3-Personal," is incorrect for the same reason. WPA3-Personal requires a password, which does not meet the open WLAN requirement.
Option C, "WPA3-Personal and MAC-Auth," is incorrect. WPA3-Personal requires a password, and MAC authentication (MAC-Auth) does not provide the web-based login experience (captive portal) specified in the requirements.
Option D, "Captive portal and Opportunistic Wireless Encryption (OWE) in transition mode," is correct. An open WLAN with OWE in transition mode allows guests to connect without a password, provides encryption for OWE-capable devices (e.g., WPA3 devices), and supports non-OWE devices without encryption. The captive portal ensures that guests are redirected to a welcome web page to log in, meeting all requirements.
The HPE Aruba Networking AOS-8 8.11 User Guide states:
"Opportunistic Wireless Encryption (OWE) is a WPA3 feature that provides encryption for open WLANs without requiring a password. In OWE transition mode, the WLAN supports both OWE-capable devices (which use encryption) and non-OWE devices (which connect without encryption) on the same SSID. This is ideal for guest networks where encryption is desired for capable devices, but compatibility with all devices is required. A captive portal can be configured on an open WLAN to redirect users to a login page, such as captive-portal guest-login, ensuring a seamless guest experience." (Page 290, OWE and Captive Portal Section)
Additionally, the HPE Aruba Networking Wireless Security Guide notes:
"OWE in transition mode is recommended for open guest WLANs where encryption is desired for devices that support it. Combined with a captive portal, this setup allows guests to connect without a password, get redirected to a login page, and benefit from encryption if their device supports OWE." (Page 35, Guest Network Security Section)
What is an Authorized client as defined by ArubaOS Wireless Intrusion Prevention System (WIP)?
Options:
a client that has a certificate issued by a trusted Certification Authority (CA)
a client that is not on the WIP blacklist
a client that has successfully authenticated to an authorized AP and passed encrypted traffic
a client that is on the WIP whitelist.
Answer:
CExplanation:
In the context of ArubaOS Wireless Intrusion Prevention System (WIP), an authorized client is defined as a client that has successfully authenticated to an authorized Access Point (AP) and has passed encrypted traffic. This ensures that only clients which have been verified and authenticated according to the network's security policies are allowed to access network resources. Authentication typically involves credentials that are validated by a server, confirming the client's right to access the network securely.
You have a network with AOS-CX switches for which HPE Aruba Networking ClearPass Policy Manager (CPPM) acts as the TACACS+ server. When an admin authenticates, CPPM sends a response with:
Aruba-Priv-Admin-User = 1
TACACS+ privilege level = 15What happens to the user?
Options:
The user receives auditors access.
The user receives no access.
The user receives administrators access.
The user receives operators access.
Answer:
CExplanation:
HPE Aruba Networking AOS-CX switches support TACACS+ for administrative authentication, where ClearPass Policy Manager (CPPM) can act as the TACACS+ server. When an admin authenticates, CPPM sends a TACACS+ response that includes attributes such as the TACACS+ privilege level and vendor-specific attributes (VSAs) like Aruba-Priv-Admin-User.
In this scenario, CPPM sends:
TACACS+ privilege level = 15: In TACACS+, privilege level 15 is the highest level and typically grants full administrative access (equivalent to a superuser or administrator role).
Aruba-Priv-Admin-User = 1: This Aruba-specific VSA indicates that the user should be granted the highest level of administrative access on the switch.
On AOS-CX switches, the privilege level 15 maps to the administrator role, which provides full read-write access to all switch functions. The Aruba-Priv-Admin-User = 1 attribute reinforces this by explicitly assigning the admin role, ensuring the user has unrestricted access.
Option A, "The user receives auditors access," is incorrect because auditors typically have read-only access, which corresponds to a lower privilege level (e.g., 1 or 3) on AOS-CX switches.
Option B, "The user receives no access," is incorrect because the authentication was successful, and CPPM sent a response granting access with privilege level 15.
Option D, "The user receives operators access," is incorrect because operators typically have a lower privilege level (e.g., 5 or 7), which provides limited access compared to an administrator.
The HPE Aruba Networking AOS-CX 10.12 Security Guide states:
"When using TACACS+ for administrative authentication, the switch interprets the privilege level returned by the TACACS+ server. A privilege level of 15 maps to the administrator role, granting full read-write access to all switch functions. The Aruba-Priv-Admin-User VSA, when set to 1, explicitly assigns the admin role, ensuring the user has unrestricted access." (Page 189, TACACS+ Authentication Section)
Additionally, the HPE Aruba Networking ClearPass Policy Manager 6.11 User Guide notes:
"ClearPass can send the Aruba-Priv-Admin-User VSA in a TACACS+ response to specify the administrative role on Aruba devices. A value of 1 indicates the admin role, which provides full administrative privileges." (Page 312, TACACS+ Enforcement Section)
You have been instructed to look in the ArubaOS Security Dashboard's client list Your goal is to find clients mat belong to the company and have connected to devices that might belong to hackers
Which client fits this description?
Options:
MAC address d8:50:e6:f3;6d;a4; Client Classification Authorized; AP Classification, interfering
MAC address d8:50:e6 f3;6e;c5; Client Classification Interfering. AP Classification Neighbor
MAC address d8:50:e6:f3;6e;60; Client Classification Interfering. AP Classification Interfering
MAC address d8:50:e6:f3;TO;ab; Client Classification Interfering. AP Classification Rogue
Answer:
DExplanation:
In the context of the ArubaOS Security Dashboard, if the goal is to find company clients that have connected to devices potentially operated by hackers, you would look for a client that is classified as 'Interfering' (indicating a security threat) while being connected to an 'AP Classification: Rogue'. A rogue AP is one that is not under the control of network administrators and is considered malicious or a security threat. Therefore, the client fitting this description is:
MAC address: d8:50:e6:f3:70:ab; Client Classification: Interfering; AP Classification: Rogue
How can ARP be used to launch attacks?
Options:
Hackers can use ARP to change their NIC's MAC address so they can impersonate legiti-mate users.
Hackers can exploit the fact that the port used for ARP must remain open and thereby gain remote access to another user's device.
A hacker can use ARP to claim ownership of a CA-signed certificate that actually belongs to another device.
A hacker can send gratuitous ARP messages with the default gateway IP to cause devices to redirect traffic to the hacker's MAC address.
Answer:
DExplanation:
ARP (Address Resolution Protocol) can indeed be exploited to conduct various types of attacks, most notably ARP spoofing/poisoning. Gratuitous ARP is a special kind of ARP message which is used by an IP node to announce or update its IP to MAC mapping to the entire network. A hacker can abuse this by sending out gratuitous ARP messages pretending to associate the IP address of the router (default gateway) with their own MAC address. This results in traffic that was supposed to go to the router being sent to the attacker instead, thus potentially enabling the attacker to intercept, modify, or block traffic.
Refer to the exhibits.
A company has added a new user group. Users in the group try to connect to the WLAN and receive errors that the connection has no Internet access. The users cannot reach any resources. The first exhibit shows the record for one of the users who cannot connect. The second exhibit shows the role to which the AOS device assigned the user’s client.
What is a likely problem?
Options:
The AOS device does not have the correct RADIUS dictionaries installed on it to understand the Aruba-User-Role VSA.
The AOS device has a server derivation rule configured on it that has overridden the role sent by CPPM.
The clients rejected the server authentication on their side because they do not have the root CA for CPPM’s RADIUS/EAP certificate.
The role name that CPPM is sending does not match the role name configured on the AOS device.
Answer:
DExplanation:
The scenario involves an AOS-8 Mobility Controller (MC) with a WLAN where a new user group has been added. Users in this group cannot connect to the WLAN, receiving errors indicating no Internet access and inability to reach resources. Exhibit 1 shows the ClearPass Policy Manager (CPPM) Access Tracker record for one user:
CPPM sends an Access-Accept with the VSA Radius:Aruba:Aruba-User-Role user_group4.
The endpoint is classified as "Known," but the user cannot access resources. Exhibit 2 (not provided but described) shows that the AOS device (MC) assigned the user’s client to the "denyall" role, which likely denies all access, explaining the lack of Internet and resource access.
Analysis:
CPPM sends the Aruba-User-Role VSA with the value "user_group4," indicating that the user should be assigned to the "user_group4" role on the MC.
However, the MC assigns the client to the "denyall" role, which typically denies all traffic, resulting in no Internet or resource access.
The issue lies in why the MC did not apply the "user_group4" role sent by CPPM.
Option A, "The AOS device does not have the correct RADIUS dictionaries installed on it to understand the Aruba-User-Role VSA," is incorrect. If the MC did not have the correct RADIUS dictionaries to understand the Aruba-User-Role VSA, it would not process the VSA at all, and the issue would likely affect all users, not just the new user group. Additionally, Aruba-User-Role is a standard VSA in AOS-8, and the dictionaries are built into the system.
Option B, "The AOS device has a server derivation rule configured on it that has overridden the role sent by CPPM," is incorrect. Server derivation rules on the MC can override roles sent by the RADIUS server (e.g., based on attributes like username or NAS-IP), but there is no indication in the scenario that such a rule is configured. If a derivation rule were overriding the role, it would likely affect more users, and the issue would not be specific to the new user group.
Option C, "The clients rejected the server authentication on their side because they do not have the root CA for CPPM’s RADIUS/EAP certificate," is incorrect. If the clients rejected the server authentication (e.g., due to a missing root CA for CPPM’s certificate), the authentication would fail entirely, and CPPM would not send an Access-Accept with the Aruba-User-Role VSA. The scenario confirms that authentication succeeded (Access-Accept was sent), so this is not the issue.
Option D, "The role name that CPPM is sending does not match the role name configured on the AOS device," is correct. CPPM sends the role "user_group4" in the Aruba-User-Role VSA, but the MC assigns the client to the "denyall" role. This suggests that the role "user_group4" does not exist on the MC, or there is a mismatch in the role name (e.g., due to case sensitivity, typos, or underscores vs. hyphens). In AOS-8, if the role specified in the Aruba-User-Role VSA does not exist on the MC, the MC falls back to a default role, which in this case appears to be "denyall," denying all access. The likely problem is that the role name "user_group4" sent by CPPM does not match the role name configured on the MC (e.g., it might be "user-group4" or a different name).
The HPE Aruba Networking AOS-8 8.11 User Guide states:
"When the Mobility Controller receives an Aruba-User-Role VSA in a RADIUS Access-Accept message, it attempts to assign the specified role to the client. If the role name sent by the RADIUS server (e.g., ‘user_group4’) does not match a role configured on the controller, the controller will fall back to a default role, such as ‘denyall,’ which may deny all access. To resolve this, ensure that the role name sent by the RADIUS server matches the role name configured on the controller, accounting for case sensitivity and naming conventions (e.g., underscores vs. hyphens)." (Page 306, Role Assignment Troubleshooting Section)
Additionally, the HPE Aruba Networking ClearPass Policy Manager 6.11 User Guide notes:
"A common issue when assigning roles via the Aruba-User-Role VSA is a mismatch between the role name sent by ClearPass and the role name configured on the Aruba device. If the role name does not match (e.g., ‘user_group4’ vs. ‘user-group4’), the device will not apply the intended role, and the client may be assigned a default role like ‘denyall,’ resulting in access issues. Verify that the role names match exactly in both ClearPass and the device configuration." (Page 290, RADIUS Role Assignment Issues Section)
Which attack is an example or social engineering?
Options:
An email Is used to impersonate a Dank and trick users into entering their bank login information on a fake website page.
A hacker eavesdrops on insecure communications, such as Remote Desktop Program (RDP). and discovers login credentials.
A user visits a website and downloads a file that contains a worm, which sell-replicates throughout the network.
An attack exploits an operating system vulnerability and locks out users until they pay the ransom.
Answer:
AExplanation:
An example of a social engineering attack is described in option A, where an email is used to impersonate a bank and deceive users into entering their bank login information on a counterfeit website. Social engineering attacks exploit human psychology rather than technical hacking techniques to gain access to systems, data, or personal information. These attacks often involve tricking people into breaking normal security procedures. The other options describe different types of technical attacks that do not primarily rely on manipulating individuals through deceptive personal interactions.
What role does the Aruba ClearPass Device Insight Analyzer play in the Device Insight architecture?
Options:
It resides in the cloud and manages licensing and configuration for Collectors
It resides on-prem and provides the span port to which traffic is mirrored for deep analytics.
It resides on-prem and is responsible for running active SNMP and Nmap scans
It resides In the cloud and applies machine learning and supervised crowdsourcing to metadata sent by Collectors
Answer:
DExplanation:
The Aruba ClearPass Device Insight Analyzer plays a crucial role within the Device Insight architecture by residing in the cloud and applying machine learning and supervised crowdsourcing to the metadata sent by Collectors. This component of the architecture is responsible for analyzing vast amounts of data collected from the network to identify and classify devices accurately. By utilizing machine learning algorithms and crowdsourced input, the Device Insight Analyzer enhances the accuracy of device detection and classification, thereby improving the overall security and management of the network.
You are checking the Security Dashboard in the Web Ul for your ArubaOS solution and see that Wireless Intrusion Prevention (WIP) has discovered a rogue radio operating in ad hoc mode with open security. What correctly describes a threat that the radio could pose?
Options:
It could open a backdoor into the corporate LAN for unauthorized users.
It is running in a non-standard 802.11 mode and could effectively jam the wireless signal.
It is flooding the air with many wireless frames in a likely attempt at a DoS attack.
It could be attempting to conceal itself from detection by changing its BSSID and SSID frequently.
Answer:
AExplanation:
A rogue radio operating in ad hoc mode with open security can pose several threats to a network. Ad hoc networks allow direct device-to-device communication without centralized control. If such a radio is present within or near a corporate environment, it can potentially be used to create a peer-to-peer network that bypasses corporate security controls, effectively acting as a backdoor into the corporate network for unauthorized users or devices. This can lead to a breach of data security and unauthorized access to network resources.
You are troubleshooting an authentication issue for Aruba switches that enforce 802 IX10 a cluster of Aruba ClearPass Policy Manager (CPPMs) You know that CPPM Is receiving and processing the authentication requests because the Aruba switches are showing Access-Rejects in their statistics However, you cannot find the record tor the Access-Rejects in CPPM Access Tracker
What is something you can do to look for the records?
Options:
Make sure that CPPM cluster settings are configured to show Access-Rejects
Verify that you are logged in to the CPPM Ul with read-write, not read-only, access
Click Edit in Access viewer and make sure that the correct servers are selected.
Go to the CPPM Event Viewer, because this is where RADIUS Access Rejects are stored.
Answer:
AExplanation:
If Access-Reject records are not showing up in the CPPM Access Tracker, one action you can take is to ensure that the CPPM cluster settings are configured to display Access-Rejects. Cluster-wide settings in CPPM can affect which records are visible in Access Tracker. Ensuring that these settings are correctly configured will allow you to view all relevant authentication records, including Access-Rejects.
Refer to the exhibit, which shows the current network topology.
You are deploying a new wireless solution with an Aruba Mobility Master (MM). Aruba Mobility Controllers (MCs). and campus APs (CAPs). The solution will Include a WLAN that uses Tunnel for the forwarding mode and Implements WPA3-Enterprise security
What is a guideline for setting up the vlan for wireless devices connected to the WLAN?
Options:
Assign the WLAN to a single new VLAN which is dedicated to wireless users
Use wireless user roles to assign the devices to different VLANs in the 100-150 range
Assign the WLAN to a named VLAN which specified 100-150 as the range of IDs.
Use wireless user roles to assign the devices to a range of new vlan IDs.
Answer:
BExplanation:
When setting up VLANs for a wireless solution with an Aruba Mobility Master (MM), Aruba Mobility Controllers (MCs), and campus APs (CAPs), it is recommended to use wireless user roles to assign devices to different VLANs. This allows for greater flexibility and control over network resources and policies applied to different user groups. Wireless user roles can dynamically assign devices to the appropriate VLAN based on a variety of criteria such as user identity, device type, location, and the resources they need to access. This approach aligns with the ArubaOS features that leverage user roles for network access control, as detailed in Aruba's configuration and administration guides.
What is one method for HPE Aruba Networking ClearPass Policy Manager (CPPM) to use DHCP to classify an endpoint?
Options:
It can determine information such as the endpoint OS from the order of options listed in Option 55 of a DHCP Discover packet.
It can respond to a client’s DHCP Discover with different DHCP Offers and then analyze the responses to identify the client OS.
It can snoop DHCP traffic to register the clients’ IP addresses. It then knows where to direct its HTTP requests to actively probe for information about the client.
It can alter the DHCP Offer to insert itself as a proxy gateway. It will then be inline in the traffic flow and can apply traffic analytics to classify clients.
Answer:
AExplanation:
HPE Aruba Networking ClearPass Policy Manager (CPPM) uses device profiling to classify endpoints, and one of its passive profiling methods involves analyzing DHCP traffic. DHCP fingerprinting is a technique where ClearPass examines the DHCP packets sent by a client, particularly the DHCP Discover packet, to identify the device’s operating system or type based on specific attributes.
Option A, "It can determine information such as the endpoint OS from the order of options listed in Option 55 of a DHCP Discover packet," is correct. DHCP Option 55 (Parameter Request List) is a field in the DHCP Discover packet where the client specifies the list of DHCP options it requests from the server. The order and combination of these options are often unique to specific operating systems or device types (e.g., Windows, Linux, macOS, or IoT devices). ClearPass maintains a database of DHCP fingerprints and matches the Option 55 data against this database to classify the endpoint.
Option B, "It can respond to a client’s DHCP Discover with different DHCP Offers and then analyze the responses," is incorrect because ClearPass does not act as a DHCP server or send DHCP Offers. It passively snoops DHCP traffic rather than actively responding to DHCP requests.
Option C, "It can snoop DHCP traffic to register the clients’ IP addresses," is partially correct in that ClearPass does snoop DHCP traffic, but the purpose is not just to register IP addresses for HTTP probing. While ClearPass can use IP addresses for active probing (e.g., HTTP or SNMP), the question specifically asks about using DHCP to classify, which is done via fingerprinting, not IP registration.
Option D, "It can alter the DHCP Offer to insert itself as a proxy gateway," is incorrect because ClearPass does not modify DHCP packets or act as a proxy gateway. This is not a function of ClearPass in the context of DHCP-based profiling.
The HPE Aruba Networking ClearPass Policy Manager 6.11 User Guide states:
"ClearPass can profile devices using DHCP fingerprinting, a passive profiling method. When a device sends a DHCP Discover packet, ClearPass examines the packet’s attributes, including the order of options in DHCP Option 55 (Parameter Request List). The combination and order of these options are often unique to specific operating systems or device types. ClearPass matches these attributes against its DHCP fingerprint database to classify the device (e.g., identifying a device as a Windows 10 laptop or an Android phone)." (Page 247, DHCP Fingerprinting Section)
Additionally, the ClearPass Device Insight Data Sheet notes:
"DHCP fingerprinting allows ClearPass to passively collect device information without interfering with network traffic. By analyzing DHCP Option 55, ClearPass can accurately determine the device’s operating system and type, enabling precise policy enforcement." (Page 3)
What is a Key feature of me ArubaOS firewall?
Options:
The firewall is stateful which means that n can track client sessions and automatically allow return traffic for permitted sessions
The firewall Includes application layer gateways (ALGs). which it uses to filter Web traffic based on the reputation of the destination web site.
The firewall examines all traffic at Layer 2 through Layer 4 and uses source IP addresses as the primary way to determine how to control traffic.
The firewall is designed to fitter traffic primarily based on wireless 802.11 headers, making it ideal for mobility environments
Answer:
AExplanation:
The ArubaOS firewall is a stateful firewall, meaning that it can track the state of active sessions and can make decisions based on the context of the traffic. This stateful inspection capability allows it to automatically allow return traffic for sessions that it has permitted, thereby enabling seamless two-way communication for authorized users while maintaining the security posture of the network.
What is one practice that can help you to maintain a digital chain of custody in your network?
Options:
Enable packet capturing on Instant AP or Mobility Controller (MC) datapath on an ongoing basis.
Ensure that all network infrastructure devices use RADIUS rather than TACACS+ to authenticate managers.
Ensure that all network infrastructure devices receive a valid clock using authenticated NTP.
Enable packet capturing on Instant AP or Mobility Controller (MC) controlpath on an ongoing basis.
Answer:
CExplanation:
A digital chain of custody ensures that evidence (e.g., logs, timestamps) collected from a network can be reliably used in legal or forensic investigations. It requires maintaining the integrity and authenticity of data, including accurate timestamps for events. HPE Aruba Networking devices, such as Instant APs, Mobility Controllers (MCs), and AOS-CX switches, support features to help maintain a digital chain of custody.
Option C, "Ensure that all network infrastructure devices receive a valid clock using authenticated NTP," is correct. Accurate and synchronized time across all network devices is critical for maintaining a digital chain of custody. Timestamps in logs (e.g., authentication events, traffic logs) must be consistent and verifiable. Network Time Protocol (NTP) is used to synchronize device clocks, and authenticated NTP ensures that the time source is trusted and not tampered with (e.g., using MD5 or SHA authentication). This practice ensures that logs from different devices can be correlated accurately during an investigation.
Option A, "Enable packet capturing on Instant AP or Mobility Controller (MC) datapath on an ongoing basis," is incorrect. While packet capturing on the datapath (user traffic) can provide detailed traffic data for analysis, enabling it on an ongoing basis is impractical due to storage and performance constraints. Packet captures are typically used for specific troubleshooting or investigations, not for maintaining a chain of custody.
Option B, "Ensure that all network infrastructure devices use RADIUS rather than TACACS+ to authenticate managers," is incorrect. The choice of RADIUS or TACACS+ for manager authentication does not directly impact the digital chain of custody. Both protocols can log authentication events, but the protocol used does not ensure the integrity of timestamps or evidence.
Option D, "Enable packet capturing on Instant AP or Mobility Controller (MC) controlpath on an ongoing basis," is incorrect for similar reasons as Option A. Control path (control plane) packet captures include management traffic (e.g., between APs and MCs), but enabling them continuously is not practical and does not directly contribute to maintaining a chain of custody. Accurate timestamps in logs are more relevant.
The HPE Aruba Networking Security Guide states:
"Maintaining a digital chain of custody requires ensuring the integrity and authenticity of network logs and events. A critical practice is to ensure that all network infrastructure devices, such as Mobility Controllers and AOS-CX switches, receive a valid and synchronized clock using authenticated NTP. Use the command ntp server
Additionally, the HPE Aruba Networking AOS-8 8.11 User Guide notes:
"Accurate time synchronization is essential for maintaining a digital chain of custody. Configure all devices to use authenticated NTP to synchronize their clocks with a trusted time source. This ensures that event logs, such as authentication and traffic logs, have consistent and reliable timestamps, which can be correlated across devices during an investigation." (Page 380, Time Synchronization Section)
How does the ArubaOS firewall determine which rules to apply to a specific client's traffic?
Options:
The firewall applies every rule that includes the dent's IP address as the source.
The firewall applies the rules in policies associated with the client's wlan
The firewall applies thee rules in policies associated with the client's user role.
The firewall applies every rule that includes the client's IP address as the source or destination.
Answer:
CExplanation:
The ArubaOS firewall determines which rules to apply to a specific client's traffic based on the rules in policies associated with the client's user role. User roles are a fundamental part of ArubaOS and the firewall policies they encompass. These roles contain policies that dictate permissions and restrictions for network traffic. When a client authenticates, it is assigned a role, and the firewall enforces the rules defined within that role for the client's traffic.
A client has accessed an HTTPS server at myhost1.example.com using Chrome. The server sends a certificate that includes these properties:
Subject name: myhost.example.com
SAN: DNS: myhost.example.com; DNS: myhost1.example.com
Extended Key Usage (EKU): Server authentication
Issuer: MyCA_SigningThe server also sends an intermediate CA certificate for MyCA_Signing, which is signed by MyCA. The client’s Trusted CA Certificate list does not include the MyCA or MyCA_Signing certificates.Which factor or factors prevent the client from trusting the certificate?
Options:
The client does not have the correct trusted CA certificates.
The certificate lacks a valid SAN.
The certificate lacks the correct EKU.
The certificate lacks a valid SAN, and the client does not have the correct trusted CA certificates.
Answer:
AExplanation:
When a client (e.g., a Chrome browser) accesses an HTTPS server, the server presents a certificate to establish a secure connection. The client must validate the certificate to trust the server. The certificate in this scenario has the following properties:
Subject name: myhost.example.com
SAN (Subject Alternative Name): DNS: myhost.example.com; DNS: myhost1.example.com
Extended Key Usage (EKU): Server authentication
Issuer: MyCA_Signing (an intermediate CA)
The server also sends an intermediate CA certificate for MyCA_Signing, signed by MyCA (the root CA).
The client’s Trusted CA Certificate list does not include MyCA or MyCA_Signing.
Certificate Validation Process:
Name Validation: The client checks if the server’s hostname (myhost1.example.com) matches the Subject name or a SAN in the certificate. Here, the SAN includes "myhost1.example.com," so the name validation passes.
EKU Validation: The client verifies that the certificate’s EKU includes "Server authentication," which is required for HTTPS. The EKU is correctly set to "Server authentication," so this validation passes.
Chain of Trust Validation: The client builds a certificate chain from the server’s certificate to a trusted root CA in its Trusted CA Certificate list. The chain is:
Server certificate (issued by MyCA_Signing)
Intermediate CA certificate (MyCA_Signing, issued by MyCA)
Root CA certificate (MyCA, which should be in the client’s trust store) The client’s Trusted CA Certificate list does not include MyCA or MyCA_Signing, meaning the client cannot build a chain to a trusted root CA. This causes the validation to fail.
Option A, "The client does not have the correct trusted CA certificates," is correct. The client’s trust store must include the root CA (MyCA) to trust the certificate chain. Since MyCA is not in the client’s Trusted CA Certificate list, the client cannot validate the chain, and the certificate is not trusted.
Option B, "The certificate lacks a valid SAN," is incorrect. The SAN includes "myhost1.example.com," which matches the server’s hostname, so the SAN is valid.
Option C, "The certificate lacks the correct EKU," is incorrect. The EKU is set to "Server authentication," which is appropriate for HTTPS.
Option D, "The certificate lacks a valid SAN, and the client does not have the correct trusted CA certificates," is incorrect because the SAN is valid, as explained above. The only issue is the missing trusted CA certificates.
The HPE Aruba Networking AOS-CX 10.12 Security Guide states:
"For a client to trust a server’s certificate during HTTPS communication, the client must validate the certificate chain to a trusted root CA in its trust store. If the root CA (e.g., MyCA) or intermediate CA (e.g., MyCA_Signing) is not in the client’s Trusted CA Certificate list, the chain of trust cannot be established, and the client will reject the certificate. The Subject Alternative Name (SAN) must include the server’s hostname, and the Extended Key Usage (EKU) must include ‘Server authentication’ for HTTPS." (Page 205, Certificate Validation Section)
Additionally, the HPE Aruba Networking Security Fundamentals Guide notes:
"A common reason for certificate validation failure is the absence of the root CA certificate in the client’s trust store. For example, if a server’s certificate is issued by an intermediate CA (e.g., MyCA_Signing) that chains to a root CA (e.g., MyCA), the client must have the root CA certificate in its Trusted CA Certificate list to trust the chain." (Page 45, Certificate Trust Issues Section)
A company has an Aruba Instant AP cluster. A Windows 10 client is attempting to connect a WLAN that enforces WPA3-Enterprise with authentication to ClearPass Policy Manager (CPPM). CPPM is configured to require EAP-TLS. The client authentication fails. In the record for this client’s authentication attempt on CPPM, you see this alert.
What is one thing that you check to resolve this issue?
Options:
whether the client has a third-party 802.1 X supplicant, as Windows 10 does not support EAP-TLS
whether the client has a valid certificate installed on it to let it support EAP-TLS
whether EAP-TLS is enabled in the SSID Profile settings for the WLAN on the IAP cluster
whether EAP-TLS is enabled in the AAA Profile settings for the WLAN on the IAP cluster
Answer:
BExplanation:
In the context of WPA3-Enterprise with EAP-TLS authentication, the error message "Client doesn’t support configured EAP methods" suggests that the client is not able to complete the EAP-TLS authentication process. EAP-TLS requires that both the server (in this case, CPPM) and the client have a valid certificate for mutual authentication. Windows 10 does support EAP-TLS natively, so options A, C, and D can be ruled out.
The most likely reason for the authentication failure is that the client device does not have the correct client certificate installed, which is required to establish a TLS session with the server. Therefore, ensuring that the client has a valid certificate installed that matches the server's requirements is the correct step to resolve this issue.
You are deploying a new wireless solution with an Aruba Mobility Master (MM). Aruba Mobility Controllers (MCs), and campus APs (CAPs). The solution will include a WLAN that uses Tunnel for the forwarding mode and WPA3-Enterprise for the security option.
You have decided to assign the WLAN to VLAN 301, a new VLAN. A pair of core routing switches will act as the default router for wireless user traffic.
Which links need to carry VLAN 301?
Options:
only links in the campus LAN to ensure seamless roaming
only links between MC ports and the core routing switches
only links on the path between APs and the core routing switches
only links on the path between APs and the MC
Answer:
BExplanation:
In a wireless network deployment with Aruba Mobility Master (MM), Mobility Controllers (MCs), and Campus APs (CAPs), where a WLAN is configured to use Tunnel mode for forwarding, the user traffic is tunneled from the APs to the MCs. VLAN 301, which is assigned to the WLAN, must be present on the links from the MCs to the core routing switches because these switches act as the default router for the wireless user traffic. It is not necessary for the VLAN to be present on all campus LAN links or AP links, only between the MCs and the core routing switches where the routing for VLAN 301 will occur.
Why might devices use a Diffie-Hellman exchange?
Options:
to agree on a shared secret in a secure manner over an insecure network
to obtain a digital certificate signed by a trusted Certification Authority
to prove knowledge of a passphrase without transmitting the passphrase
to signal that they want to use asymmetric encryption for future communications
Answer:
AExplanation:
Devices use the Diffie-Hellman exchange to agree on a shared secret in a secure manner over an insecure network. The main purpose of this cryptographic protocol is to enable two parties to establish a shared secret over an unsecured communication channel. This shared secret can then be used to encrypt subsequent communications using a symmetric key cipher. The Diffie-Hellman exchange is particularly valuable because it allows the secure exchange of cryptographic keys over a public channel without the need for a prior shared secret. This protocol is a foundational element for many secure communications protocols, including SSL/TLS, which is used to secure connections on the internet. References to the Diffie-Hellman protocol and its uses can be found in standard cryptographic textbooks and documentation such as those from the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) and security protocol specifications.
What is a consideration for using MAC authentication (MAC-Auth) to secure a wired or wireless connection?
Options:
As a Layer 2 authentication method, MAC-Auth cannot be used to authenticate devices to an external authentication server.
It is very easy for hackers to spoof their MAC addresses and get around MAC authentication.
MAC-Auth can add a degree of security to an open WLAN by enabling the generation of a PMK to encrypt traffic.
Headless devices, such as Internet of Things (loT) devices, must be configured in advance to support MAC-Auth.
Answer:
BExplanation:
MAC authentication, also known as MAC-Auth, is a method used to authenticate devices based on their Media Access Control (MAC) address. It is often employed in both wired and wireless networks to grant network access based solely on the MAC address of a device. While MAC-Auth is straightforward and doesn’t require complex configuration, it has significant security limitations primarily because MAC addresses can be easily spoofed. Attackers can change the MAC address of their device to match an authorized one, thereby gaining unauthorized access to the network. This susceptibility to MAC address spoofing makes MAC-Auth a weaker security mechanism compared to more robust authentication methods like 802.1X, which involves mutual authentication and encryption protocols.
What is one of the roles of the network access server (NAS) in the AAA framework?
Options:
It negotiates with each user’s device to determine which EAP method is used for authentication.
It determines which resources authenticated users are allowed to access and monitors each user’s session.
It enforces access to network services and sends accounting information to the AAA server.
It authenticates legitimate users and uses policies to determine which resources each user is allowed to access.
Answer:
CExplanation:
The AAA (Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting) framework is used in network security to manage user access. In this framework, the Network Access Server (NAS) plays a specific role. In an HPE Aruba Networking environment, the NAS is typically a device like a Mobility Controller (MC) or an AOS-CX switch that interacts with an AAA server (e.g., ClearPass Policy Manager, CPPM) to authenticate users.
NAS Role in AAA:
Authentication: The NAS acts as a client to the AAA server (e.g., via RADIUS), forwarding authentication requests from the user’s device to the server. It does not perform the authentication itself; the AAA server authenticates the user.
Authorization: After authentication, the NAS receives authorization attributes from the AAA server (e.g., a user role via Aruba-User-Role VSA) and enforces access policies (e.g., firewall rules, VLAN assignment) based on those attributes.
Accounting: The NAS sends accounting information (e.g., session start/stop, data usage) to the AAA server to track user activity.
Option A, "It negotiates with each user’s device to determine which EAP method is used for authentication," is incorrect. The NAS does not negotiate the EAP method with the user’s device. The EAP method (e.g., EAP-TLS, PEAP) is determined by the configuration on the NAS and the AAA server, and the client must support the configured method. The negotiation of EAP methods occurs between the client (supplicant) and the AAA server, with the NAS acting as a pass-through.
Option B, "It determines which resources authenticated users are allowed to access and monitors each user’s session," is incorrect. The NAS enforces access policies based on authorization attributes received from the AAA server, but it does not determine which resources users can access—that decision is made by the AAA server based on its policies. Monitoring sessions is part of accounting, but this option overstates the NAS’s role in determining access.
Option C, "It enforces access to network services and sends accounting information to the AAA server," is correct. The NAS enforces access by applying policies (e.g., firewall rules, VLANs) based on the authorization attributes received from the AAA server. It also sends accounting information (e.g., session start/stop, data usage) to the AAA server to track user activity, fulfilling its role in the accounting part of AAA.
Option D, "It authenticates legitimate users and uses policies to determine which resources each user is allowed to access," is incorrect. The NAS does not authenticate users; the AAA server performs authentication. The NAS also does not determine resource access; it enforces the policies provided by the AAA server.
The HPE Aruba Networking AOS-8 8.11 User Guide states:
"In the AAA framework, the Network Access Server (NAS), such as a Mobility Controller, acts as a client to the AAA server (e.g., a RADIUS server). The NAS forwards authentication requests from the user’s device to the AAA server, enforces access to network services based on the authorization attributes returned by the server (e.g., user role, VLAN), and sends accounting information, such as session start and stop records, to the AAA server for tracking." (Page 310, AAA Framework Section)
Additionally, the HPE Aruba Networking ClearPass Policy Manager 6.11 User Guide notes:
"The NAS in the AAA framework, such as an Aruba Mobility Controller, does not authenticate users itself; it forwards authentication requests to the AAA server (ClearPass). After authentication, the NAS enforces access policies based on the server’s response and sends accounting data to the AAA server to log user activity, such as session duration and data usage." (Page 280, NAS Role in AAA Section)
What is a vulnerability of an unauthenticated Dime-Heliman exchange?
Options:
A hacker can replace the public values exchanged by the legitimate peers and launch an MITM attack.
A brute force attack can relatively quickly derive Diffie-Hellman private values if they are able to obtain public values
Diffie-Hellman with elliptic curve values is no longer considered secure in modem networks, based on NIST recommendations.
Participants must agree on a passphrase in advance, which can limit the usefulness of Diffie- Hell man in practical contexts.
Answer:
AExplanation:
The vulnerability of an unauthenticated Diffie-Hellman exchange, particularly when it comes to the risk of a man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack, is a significant concern. In this scenario, a hacker can intercept the public values exchanged between two legitimate parties and substitute them with their own. This allows the attacker to decrypt or manipulate the messages passing between the two original parties without them knowing. This answer is based on the fundamental principles of how Diffie-Hellman key exchange works and its vulnerabilities without authentication mechanisms. Reference materials from cryptographic textbooks and security protocols detail these vulnerabilities, such as those found in standards and publications by organizations like NIST.
Your HPE Aruba Networking Mobility Master-based solution has detected a rogue AP. Among other information, the AOS Detected Radios page lists this information for the AP:
SSID = PublicWiFi
BSSID = a8:bd:27:12:34:56
Match method = Plus one
Match method = Eth-Wired-Mac-Table
The security team asks you to explain why this AP is classified as a rogue. What should you explain?
Options:
The AP has been detected using multiple MAC addresses. This indicates that the AP is spoofing its MAC address, which qualifies it as a suspected rogue.
The AP is probably connected to your LAN because it has a BSSID that is close to a MAC address that has been detected in your LAN. Because it does not belong to the company, it is a suspected rogue.
The AP is an AP that belongs to your solution. However, the AOS has detected that it is behaving suspiciously. It might have been compromised, so it is classified as a suspected rogue.
The AP has a BSSID that is close to your authorized APs’ BSSIDs. This indicates that the AP might be spoofing the corporate SSID and attempting to lure clients to it, making the AP a suspected rogue.
Answer:
BExplanation:
HPE Aruba Networking’s Wireless Intrusion Prevention (WIP) system, part of the AOS-8 architecture (Mobility Master and Mobility Controllers), is designed to detect and classify rogue APs. The "AOS Detected Radios" page provides details about detected APs, including their SSID, BSSID, and match methods used to classify them.
In this case, the AP is classified as a rogue with the following match methods:
Plus one: This indicates that the BSSID of the detected AP is numerically close (e.g., differs by one in the last octet) to the MAC address of a known device in the network.
Eth-Wired-Mac-Table: This indicates that the AP’s MAC address (or a closely related MAC address) was found in the wired network’s MAC address table, suggesting that the AP is connected to the LAN.
These match methods suggest that the AP is likely connected to the company’s wired LAN (via the Eth-Wired-Mac-Table match) and has a BSSID that is close to a known device’s MAC address (Plus one match). Since this AP is not part of the company’s authorized AP list (it’s broadcasting "PublicWiFi," which may not be a corporate SSID), it is classified as a suspected rogue. This scenario is common when an unauthorized AP is plugged into the corporate LAN, posing a security risk.
Option A, "The AP has been detected using multiple MAC addresses," is incorrect because the match methods do not indicate multiple MAC addresses; they indicate a close match to a known MAC and a presence in the wired MAC table.
Option C, "The AP is an AP that belongs to your solution," is incorrect because the AP is classified as a rogue, meaning it is not part of the authorized APs in the solution.
Option D, "The AP has a BSSID that is close to your authorized APs’ BSSIDs," is partially correct in that the "Plus one" match indicates a close BSSID, but the key reason for the rogue classification is its connection to the LAN (Eth-Wired-Mac-Table), not just the BSSID similarity.
The HPE Aruba Networking AOS-8 8.11 User Guide states:
"The Wireless Intrusion Prevention (WIP) system detects rogue APs by analyzing their BSSIDs, SSIDs, and connectivity to the wired network. The ‘Eth-Wired-Mac-Table’ match method indicates that the AP’s MAC address (or a closely related address) was found in the wired network’s MAC address table, suggesting that the AP is connected to the LAN. The ‘Plus one’ match method indicates that the AP’s BSSID is numerically close to a known MAC address in the network, which can indicate a potential rogue device attempting to mimic a legitimate device." (Page 412, Rogue AP Detection Section)
Additionally, the guide notes:
"A rogue AP is classified as ‘suspected rogue’ if it is detected on the wired network (e.g., via Eth-Wired-Mac-Table) and is not part of the authorized AP list. This often occurs when an unauthorized AP is connected to the corporate LAN." (Page 413, Rogue AP Classification Section)
Which endpoint classification capabilities do Aruba network infrastructure devices have on their own without ClearPass solutions?
Options:
ArubaOS-CX switches can use a combination of active and passive methods to assign roles to clients.
ArubaOS devices (controllers and lAPs) can use DHCP fingerprints to assign roles to clients.
ArubaOS devices can use a combination of DHCP fingerprints, HTTP User-Agent strings, and Nmap to construct endpoint profiles.
ArubaOS-Switches can use DHCP fingerprints to construct detailed endpoint profiles.
Answer:
BExplanation:
Without the integration of Aruba ClearPass or other advanced network access control solutions, ArubaOS devices (controllers and Instant APs) are able to use DHCP fingerprinting to assign roles to clients. This method allows the devices to identify the type of client devices connecting to the network based on the DHCP requests they send. While this is a more basic form of endpoint classification compared to the capabilities provided by ClearPass, it still enables some level of access control based on device type. This functionality and its limitations are described in Aruba's product documentation for ArubaOS devices, highlighting the benefits of integrating a full-featured solution like ClearPass for more granular and powerful endpoint classification capabilities.
You have an AOS-8 architecture, consisting of a Mobility Conductor (MC) and Mobility Controllers (MCs). You want to monitor wireless clients’ application usage in the Traffic Analysis dashboard. What is a requirement?
Options:
Configuring packet capturing on the MCs’ data plane
Enabling logging on the users category on the MCs
Discovering the mobility devices in HPE Aruba Networking Central
Enabling firewall visibility and deep packet inspection (DPI) on the MCs
Answer:
DExplanation:
In an AOS-8 architecture with a Mobility Conductor (MC) and Mobility Controllers (MCs), the Traffic Analysis dashboard (available in the MC UI) allows administrators to monitor wireless clients’ application usage (e.g., identifying traffic from applications like Zoom, YouTube, or Skype). To enable this functionality, the MCs must be able to inspect and classify client traffic at the application level.
Firewall Visibility and DPI: The AOS-8 platform includes a stateful firewall that can perform deep packet inspection (DPI) to classify traffic based on application signatures. Enabling "firewall visibility" on the MCs activates DPI, allowing the firewall to inspect packet payloads and identify applications. This data is then used by the Traffic Analysis dashboard to display application usage statistics for wireless clients.
Option D, "Enabling firewall visibility and deep packet inspection (DPI) on the MCs," is correct. Firewall visibility must be enabled on the MCs to perform DPI and classify client traffic by application. This is typically done with the command firewall visibility in the MC configuration, which activates DPI and allows the Traffic Analysis dashboard to display application usage data.
Option A, "Configuring packet capturing on the MCs’ data plane," is incorrect. Packet capturing (e.g., using the packet-capture command) is used for manual troubleshooting or analysis, not for enabling the Traffic Analysis dashboard. Packet captures generate raw packet data, which is not processed for application usage statistics.
Option B, "Enabling logging on the users category on the MCs," is incorrect. Enabling logging for the "users" category (e.g., using the logging command) generates logs for user events (e.g., authentication, role assignment), but it does not provide application usage data for the Traffic Analysis dashboard.
Option C, "Discovering the mobility devices in HPE Aruba Networking Central," is incorrect. While discovering devices in Aruba Central can provide centralized monitoring, the Traffic Analysis dashboard in AOS-8 is a local feature on the MC and does not require Aruba Central. Additionally, application usage monitoring requires DPI on the MCs, not just device discovery.
The HPE Aruba Networking AOS-8 8.11 User Guide states:
"The Traffic Analysis dashboard on the Mobility Controller provides visibility into wireless clients’ application usage, such as identifying traffic from applications like Zoom or YouTube. To enable this feature, you must enable firewall visibility and deep packet inspection (DPI) on the MCs. Use the command firewall visibility to activate DPI, which allows the firewall to classify traffic by application. The classified data is then displayed in the Traffic Analysis dashboard under Monitoring > Traffic Analysis." (Page 360, Traffic Analysis Dashboard Section)
Additionally, the HPE Aruba Networking Security Guide notes:
"Firewall visibility on AOS-8 Mobility Controllers enables deep packet inspection (DPI) to classify client traffic by application. This is required for features like the Traffic Analysis dashboard, which displays application usage statistics for wireless clients, helping administrators monitor network activity." (Page 55, Firewall Visibility Section)